apriori =analytic?

There was thread on OG were TPK said that a priori isn´t the same as analytic and that a posteriori isn´t the same as analytic.

Is he right or wrong in your opinion?


and please also explain *why* you think so.

There was thread on OG were TPK said that a priori isn´t the same as analytic and that a posteriori isn´t the same as analytic.

I guess he said that a posteriori doesn´t equal synthetic.

Is he right or wrong in your opinion?

Quine and TPK are wrong.

and please also explain *why* you think so.

Because I´m an evil empirist and one of the Two Dogmas of Empiricism "is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact."

That was a damn loooong essay from Quine. I'll try to read it when I have more time. I hope TPK can come here and defend his opinion, so I can learn something and stir up some shit. :)

I think I may have mentioned that, if you're referring to the idea that there can be contingent a priori truths and necessary a posteriori truths.

The idea is found in Kripke's paper "Naming and Necessity"

I'll come back to this later...

The idea is found in Kripke's paper "Naming and Necessity" Damn... now there's something that I haven't read in 14 years.Fudo, I need to re-educate myself on this before I can post something even 1/2 intelligent.

don´t be shy TPK, I know you can debate your view already!

*stirring up shit*

Until Cabal1 returns..

so the question goes to the evil Empiricist (a.k.a. Dogbert):

If I understand Quines argument correct, he points out that even analytic statements eventually becomes syntetic, because you´ll have to find out "common usage" of the language. But what´s the problem with that, can´t you still fall back onto empiricism?


So my question is; why would it be a problem (for LP) if the distinction between analytic and syntetic isn´t solid?

Carnaps answer to Quines paper was that he would attribute the problem to the ambiguities (sp?) of ordinary language, but not as a philosophically significant problem.

"So my question is; why would it be a problem (for LP) if the distinction between analytic and syntetic isn´t solid?"

Because we call stuff that is neither analytic nor synthetic nonsense.

"Because we call stuff that is neither analytic nor synthetic nonsense.
"

I still don´t see the problem. Why just not give up the distinction and call everything empiric (syntetic)?

you can still call metaphysics (the rest) nonsense, can´t you?

No, because mathematics and logic isn´t empiric/synthetic/ a posteriori. So LPs divide all legitimat knowledge in synthetic and analytic knowledge. There isn´t really anything in between.

"No, because mathematics and logic isn´t empiric/synthetic/ a posteriori."

how do you know that?

The concepts talked about in mathematics and logic aren´t found in the empirical world, so general statements about "mathematical objects" cannot be interpreted as inductive generalization. Also we can´t really imagine what evidence would make a mathematical statement wrong. And the role of proofs in mathematics doesn´t correspond to any empirical stuff.

"The concepts talked about in mathematics and logic aren´t found in the empirical world"

You have never seen a circle or a triangle?


"Also we can´t really imagine what evidence would make a mathematical statement wrong."


We can look at the logic Law of Excluded Middle (either P or not-P) for example. Evidence of uncertainty from QM suggests that this law is false.

"You have never seen a circle or a triangle?"

Exactly.

"We can look at the logic Law of Excluded Middle (either P or not-P) for example. Evidence of uncertainty from QM suggests that this law is false."

There is no evidence suggesting that. Evidence cannot suggest such a thing.

Me: "You have never seen a circle or a triangle?"

Dogbert :"Exactly"

 

Me: Poor fella, let me help..

 

 

"There is no evidence suggesting that. Evidence cannot suggest such a thing. "

 

Quantumparticles and Schroedinger disagress.

http://www.lassp.cornell.edu/ardlouis/dissipative/Schrcat.html

 

 

 

 

That´s a bunch of pixels, not a triangle and a circle.

"Quantumparticles and Schroedinger disagress."

Schroedinger may have agreed, but he wasn´t that much an expert of logic. And nothing from the link you gave indicates that the law of the excluded middle doesn´t hold. That is quite plausible, since the law of the excluded middle is a property of language, not of the "physical world".

Technically, TPK is uncontroversially correct. A prioricity is an epistemic property, i.e., it is a way of knowing something. Analyticity is a property of statements or their meanings. Therefore, these certainly aren't synonyms.

The correct questions to ask are whether all analytic truths must be known a priori and whether anything known to be true a priori is analytic.

It's late, and I'm on the road so I'll come back to this later.

ttt