Critique my work please

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Defendant, XXXXXXX, by and through the undersigned attorney, files this Motion to Suppress and shows the following:

1.  Defendant has been charged with the offense of Driving on a Revoked Drivers License.

2.  Defendant was arrested without lawful warrant, probable cause or other lawful authority in violation of the rights of Defendant pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

3.  Any statements obtained from Defendant were obtained in violation of the rights of Defendant pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, sections 9, 16, and 21 of the Florida Constitution, and Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190(i).

4.  All other evidence in this matter was obtained due to the unlawful stop of the Defendant without probable cause or other lawful authority in violation of the rights of Defendant pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution.  As such all evidence obtained by the arresting officer is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" as set forth in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471(1963).

5.  Defendant was arrested and charged with Driving on a Revoked Driver's License in violation of Florida Statute § 322.34(5).  The arresting officer lacked probable cause to make the traffic stop as the arresting officer did not witness the Defendant commit a violation of Chapter 316, also known as the State Uniform Traffic Control.  Pursuant to Florida Statute § 901.15(5), an officer may only make an arrest for a violation of chapter 316 if the offense is committed in his or her presence.

6.  The arresting officer in this matter was notified by CSO L. and CSO G. that the

Defendant committed a violation of chapter 316. It is important for the court to note that a CSO is a "community service officer" and not a police officer authorized to make traffic stops .

7.  The State relies on the "Fellow Officer Rule" sometimes referred to as the Collective

Knowledge Doctrine. However, this rule is inapplicable to the current matter. "The fellow officer rule or doctrine operates to impute the knowledge of one officer in the chain of investigation to another." State v. Adderly, 809 So.2d 75, 76(Fla. 4th DCA 2002) quoting State v. Evans, 692 So.2d 216, 218(Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

8.  There is a salient distinction between the cases cited in the case at hand being that the individual reporting the Chapter 316 to the arresting officer in this matter was not a police officer.  The individual reporting the violation to the officer in this matter was a civilian hired by the police department to conduct ministerial functions such as write accident reports, take statements, etc.  However, upon information and belief, a Community Service Officer has absolutely no law enforcement authority.  As such, a CSO is not a police officer or fellow officer for purposes of the fellow officer rule.

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that the Court suppress such matters at trial of this cause, and for such other and further relief in connection therewith that is proper.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

COMES NOW, Defendant, XXXXXXX, by and through his undersigned counsel and pursuant to Rule 3.190(h), Fla. R. Crim. P., moves this Court to issue an order suppressing certain evidence that may be used in this case.  The specific evidence sought to be suppressed is as follows:

1.  Approximately .6 grams of a substance alleged to be cannabis and that it was illegally seized by Officer C. from Defendant's person on June ??, 2006 at approximately 1:18am;

2.  A smoking pipe, alleged to be used for smoking marijuana and that it was illegally seized by Office C. from Defendant's vehicle on June ??, 2006 at approximately 1:18am.

3.  All statements made by the Defendant to Officer C. during the stop on June ??, 2006.

The grounds for this motion are that all of the aforementioned evidence was illegally seized without a warrant by virtue of an unlawful detention of the Defendant in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

BACKGROUND FACTS

4.  On June ??, 2006, Defendant was sitting in a lawfully parked vehicle at a strip mall located at ?? M. Street, Hollywood, FL.

5.  At approximately 1:18am, Defendant was approached by Officer C. of the Hollywood Police Department.  At an unknown point in time, Officer C. requested a backup unit.

6.  Officer C. requested that the Defendant produce identification.  The Defendant complied and produced his driver's license to Officer C.  While Officer C. had possession of Defendant's Driver's License, Officer D.arrived as backup.

7.  Once Officer D. arrived, Officer C. requested that the Defendant step out of the vehicle to which the Defendant complied.

8.  Once the Defendant had stepped out of the vehicle, Officer C. allegedly asked the Defendant if he would allow a search of his pockets for illegal items to which the Defendant allegedly consented.

9.  A search of the Defendant's pockets revealed a white baggie containing approximately .6 grams of marijuana.

10. Officer C. inquired as to if there were any other illegal items in the vehicle.  The Defendant informed Officer C. of the location of a pipe in the vehicle.

11. Defendant was issued a citation for possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

12. The marijuana and drug paraphernalia evidence must be suppressed as the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop.  Accordingly, the Defendant's purported consent is presumptively tainted and rendered involuntary by the illegal detention.

13. The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Florida recognize three distinct levels of police-citizen encounters.  These levels are a consensual encounter, an investigatory stop and an arrest supported by probable cause.  See Brye v. State of Florida, 927 So.2d 78, 81(Fla. 1st DCA 2006) citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544(1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968); Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186(Fla. 1993).

14. A consensual encounter involves minimal police contact.  Because the individual is free to leave during a consensual encounter, constitutional safeguards are not invoked.  See Brye, 927 So.2d at 81 citing Mendenhall(citation omitted).

15. The second level of encounter is an investigatory stop.  In order not to violate a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights, as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, an investigatory stop requires a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  See Popple v. State of Florida, 626 So.2d 185, 86(Fla. 1993) citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968).

16. In Officer C.'s Narrative, a copy of which is attached and made a part hereof as Exhibit "A", Officer C. does not state any valid basis for an investigatory stop. 

17. The incident began as consensual, however, became an investigatory stop due to the fact that Officer C. requested that the Defendant step out of the vehicle.  Whether the Officer characterizes this as a request or as an order, Officer C.'s mere direction for the Defendant to exit the vehicle constitutes a show of authority which restrains the Defendant's freedom of movement because a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he should comply.  As such, the Defendant was seized by virtue of submitting to Officer C.'s show of authority.  See Popple at 188 citing Dees v. State, 564 So.2d 1166(Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

18.  As Officer C. did not have a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the investigatory stop violated the Defendant's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

19. Defendant's subsequent purported consent to be searched is presumptively tainted and rendered involuntary by the illegal detention.  See Brye at 85 citing Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643, 647(Fla. 1980); State v. Campbell, 911 So.2d 192, 193(Fla. 4th DCA 2005)

WHEREFORE, Defendant, XXXXXXX, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to issue an order finding that the stop and detention by Officer C. were illegal and suppressing all of the aforementioned evidence.

I'M A FUCKING PIMP!!!

Not too bad at all, but this part could use a bit more development, perhaps, as it's the cornerstone of your legal argument:

"However, upon information and belief, a Community Service Officer has absolutely no law enforcement authority. As such, a CSO is not a police officer or fellow officer for purposes of the fellow officer rule."

Is there no statute or caselaw that pertains to the ability of the police to hire a CSO or that specifically addresses their authority?  I take it CSOs are pure civilians, not sworn peace officers and not required to attend whatever academy you have there?  Is there a statute that sets forth who is a peace officer and who can exercise the powers of a peace officer?

Who reads motions? I fight it out at the hearing.

-Shaz!