Is physicalism contingent?

Is physicalism contingent?

Are there possible worlds in which numbers, sets, properties, ect. exist?

"Are there possible worlds in which numbers, sets, properties, ect. exist?"

That would be a world in which the objects and the relationships between them give a model of set theory (one can derive numbers and stuff from set theory). 

I'm not sure how that answers the question, or if you were even trying to. LOL

"Are there possible worlds in which numbers, sets, properties, ect.
exist?"

Sure. In fact the actual world might be just such a possible world. Why,
do you think that physicalism is necessarily incompatible with the
existence of such objects (numbers, sets, colors, pains, relations, etc)?

"Why, do you think that physicalism is necessarily incompatible with the existence of such objects (numbers, sets, colors, pains, relations, etc)? "

It probably isn´t. Thera are some arguments against physicalism and they happen to focus on meaning/ intentionality and consciousness and the subjective aspect of experiencing (as in pain and colours etc) But it exists counterarguments to those of course, so in the end it all depends on what arguments that you find compelling.

Yes, I do take abstract enties as being opposed to physicalism.

"Yes, I do take abstract enties as being opposed to physicalism. "

Then a physicalist can always answer that those abstract entities don´t really exist. Only as a creation of us humans, in our mind...ehum.. I mean Brains.

They may very well.

But I just want to know if they think the world could of turned out differently, such that there were actually non-spacio-temporal multiply exemplifiable entities?

Or if the non-existence of such entities is necessary.

Then you better ask one that believes in physicalism, because I don´t

Shame on you Fudo...

I have always been abit of a rebel like that.. ;-)

So... Fudo!

Why do you not believe in physicalism?

for alot of reasons, but most of it boils down to personal experiences, the rest is coating, or we can call it rationalizations.

Care to elaborate?

on mail, if you don´t mind. Do you have an adress?

trianglechoke7@yahoo.com

mail sent

A possible ambiguity here...Are you asking...

i) Does physicalism require that truths about the relationships between physical phenomena and high-level phenomena necessarily true?

Yes. For example, it requires that the statements describing the supervenience relationship between physical states and mental states be necesssary truths. For a good discussion of this, see Frank Jackson or David Chalmers.

ii) Is a statement of the physicalist position a necessary truth (if true)? It seems to be the answer is yes, just offhand. Consider mathematics. All of its truths are necessary truths. Hence, the statement "Mathematics is true" is necesarily true. Can you imagine a world where that sentence is false?

I have Frank Jackson with me now. I havn't read it yet but it's next on my list. I also have two articles that argue against conceptual analysis that I'm going to read after I read Jackson.

Is Frank Jackson trying to find a fit between abstract phenomena and a physicalist world-view?

"

Is Frank Jackson trying to find a fit between abstract phenomena and a physicalist world-view? "


If it´s the Frank Jackson I have read, he is famous for the argument about the Scientist Mary that lives in a black/white lab and then gets released and learns new stuff. Which some think is a good argument against physicalism.


I´ll see if I can find the argument or the text somewhere..