Scientists, God and Logic


Cool.

Or maybe I should take a bit of this stuff to the philosophy forum, where they can kick me around :-)

Prof.

"He is young boy from Austria that studies Logic and Economics."

Delenda est Sweden! :P

"Or maybe I should take a bit of this stuff to the philosophy forum, where they can kick me around :-)"

You are welcome.

Now to the logic debate:

I will divide this in two parts, one about what constitutes correct logical reasoning and the second, more philosophical, what "the nature" of logic is.

1. Logical propositions are not empirical. Let´s look at an argument: "No bachelor is married. Rastus is married. Therefore Rastus is not a Bachelor.": Let´s split this in two assumptions (the first can also be seen as a definition) "No bachelor is married." and "Rastus is married." The conclusion is. "Rastus is not a Bachelor." Logic tells us that as long as the first two are correct, the conclusion is true too.

If logic would be empirically than the truth of our inference would depend on empirical data. We somehow got enough data to be absolutely sure (it doesn´t matter if we really can) that our assumptions are true. Now if we find that Rastus isn´t a bachelor, it kind of supports the truth of our inference (the problem of induction would still apply). So what must happened so that the inference is wrong? Rastus has to be a bachelor. So we could reject the inference if we find evidence that all bachelors are unmarried and that Rastus is married and a bachelor. That´s of course impossible qua language. If I say Rastus is married and no bachelor is married I´m already saying Rastus is no bachelor, which brings us to the next topic.

2. I think, and many smart people disagree, that logical know is knowledge about language. Mathematical logic is a abstraction of actual languages. If I know that 2+2=4 I don´t have to know some eternal truth, it suffices to know what 2,4 and addition mean. Logic is just a way of using the rules of language, it can´t tell us anything new. In philosophyground language: Logic is analytic and can´t give us synthetic knowledge...

My world is chrashing in.... I totally agree with.... I am at a loss... I am totally in agreement with Rastus!


Dogbert has summed it up better than I could.

lol, why would you like to wipe out Sweden Dogbert? You know how many Rotties we have. ;)

P.s. didn´t know you studied Latin aswell!d.s

"lol, why would you like to wipe out Sweden Dogbert? You know how many Rotties we have. ;)"

Shit, you are correct!

I forgot most of my latin.

"Shit, you are correct! "

Of course. ;)

"I forgot most of my latin. "

I hardly know any to be honest, I can only figure out some things because I speak portuguese now and there´s a alot of latin influence in there.

btw regarding Tulkas comment, I didn´t get the impression you supported Rastus view of Logic here, but Profs. Am I wrong?

It´s kinda strange. I actually don´t know who believes what.

That´s the problem with metaphysics!

lol

Dogbert,

If I've read you right, we are basically agreeing.
I've been arguing:

1. Logic is a tool of human cognition (necessarily tied to language and semantics).

AND that:

2. It is a tool based, at least originally, upon human interpretation of reality. I.e., reality was the original guide to the foundations of logic.

Therefore I believe logic is (was) at it's root determined by reality. And I still feel that reality (observation) holds primacy over logically derived proofs. So, I completely agree when you say Logical propositions are not empirical. But I feel the logical concepts were originally derived from empericical observation (even if only intuitive, non-intellecualized observation - it's just how our brains work and how the world is on the macro level).

I think the very valid observations made by Rastus are accommodated in my view, even if we quibble over definitions of logic (in other words, we tend to agree on end results).

My point is general enough to, I think, accommodate the problem of "Two Logics" (originally posited by Veatch?), which highlights the seeming schism between logic rooted in reality, and logic dealing in abstractions. In other words, I'd agree with the view: 1. The predicative inferences of original Aristotelian logic are natural both to observations of reality, and to the spoken word.

However, 2. There categories of pure logic including math, which weave logical relations of great technical power and abstraction without being grounded in any particular human purposes or without being interpretive of a definite experiential domain. (And whether such endeavors can or even *should* be made metaphysically rooted to nature is, as you no doubt know, a question among philosophers).

So, yeah, logic has expanded beyond the experiential realm, but I still feel that our logic system was rooted in how we experience reality (and how we use language). Cause and effect being an inescapable cue to the formation of a cognitive ordering system like logic (although Rastus may redefine logic's "ordering system," to something with less temporal implications: "cataloguing system" maybe?).

Dogbert, I can't say I agree when you say: "Logic can´t tell us anything new." I'm sure you were making a semantic point, and maybe it just didn't take in my brain. But even if we take the logic of mathematics, then in fact it can tell us something new (E=MC2 for one). But, as a way of knowing our world, I hold logical conclusions in suspicion unless or until they are also empirically verified.

One way I might differ from Rastus is that it seems he holds the way logic is used in suspicion, while I might hold logic itself in suspicion (often needing empiricism to complete my confidence in some of it's conclusions).

Thanks for your input.

Prof.

"It´s kinda strange. I actually don´t know who believes what."

If it's not clear from the post I just made, then it's likely my fault and I'm not expressing myself clearly to you. (You could always ask me a direct question, I s'pose).

Prof.

"Dogbert, I can't say I agree when you say: "Logic can´t tell us anything new." I'm sure you were making a semantic point, and maybe it just didn't take in my brain."

Well, I meant that logic is empirically empty.

"But even if we take the logic of mathematics, then in fact it can tell us something new (E=MC2 for one)."

Isn´t that a empirical statement?

"One way I might differ from Rastus is that it seems he holds the way logic is used in suspicion, while I might hold logic itself in suspicion (often needing empiricism to complete my confidence in some of it's conclusions)."

That´s what I can´t agree with. Logic cannot be validated or disproved by empirics, it is the very language you have to formulate your empirics in.


"One way I might differ from Rastus is that it seems he holds the way logic is used in suspicion,"

That is precisely my view

"while I might hold logic itself in suspicion (often needing empiricism to complete my confidence in some of it's conclusions). "

Might??? Might hold? Well what is it, prof? Do you hold it in suspician or not? ;)

Logic represents, as I've stated before, necessary and inescapable existential statements BASED ON THE VERACITY OF THE GIVENS. It is not possible to consider their alternative, for the very consideration relies on logic itself to enter the inquiry.

(Tulka§...you are mine...MINE!!! HAHAHa!!! (crams him in a bird cage, and walks away...)

prof,

One of the problems I have with any of your constructions is what is considered foundational - primary existence. Logic precedes any other consideration. Now, our cognitive formulation of logic may require semantics and other abstractions, but the map ain't the land.

Again, it's not possible to logic not functioning...only the givens on which logic operates.

Another observation about logic - it creates nothing. Suppose you introduced yourself as your aunt's sister's son...but I knew your aunt was my mother. I'd then say, "Hello, cousin!"...but was anything created there? No...just a categorical recognition - an inescapable existential reality.

Suppose I have two disjoint sets, A and B. If x is in A, logic tells us that x is not in B, since A and B are disjoint. The only logic used was the necessary and inescapable observation of the given - A and B are disjoint.

Dogbert,

"That´s the problem with metaphysics! "

...which is why I loath the subject I love ;)

and btw, if logic DID create anything new, it would surrender its status as mere existential categorical imperitives, and assume a type of formative engine...which it most certainly is not.

You've got to tap out on this one, prof... logic is in no way empirically dependent.

"Might??? Might hold? Well what is it, prof? Do you hold it in suspician or not? ;)"

Darn, I knew you'd pick up on that one! It was a stupid way of hedging bets. In other words I don't know that logic does not in fact have objective characteristics beyond being a linguistic/cognitive tool. Which is why I put in "might" be suspicious (I'm still open to the argument). Just remove "might" and "suspicious" makes the same point.


"Suppose I have two disjoint sets, A and B. If x is in A, logic tells us that x is not in B"

But reason and experience would inform us that logical conclusion can't be trusted until we first know that there is only one X. (In other words, if we don't know that X is singular, there may also be X in B).

Sorry, just being cheeky.

I'll try to get to your other points, which I think are good, later.

Prof.

"But even if we take the logic of mathematics, then in fact it can tell us something new (E=MC2 for one)."

Dogbert: Isn´t that a empirical statement?

No. Not until it was empirically verified. The theory started from empirical antecedents and proceeded via logic (math) to a conclusion, which was afterward proven empirically (at which point it could be seen as an empirical statement). Before it was empirical though, it was just a logical statement derived from physical mathematics.

Agree? Disagree?

Prof.

"No. Not until it was empirically verified. The theory started from empirical antecedents and proceeded via logic (math) to a conclusion, which was afterward proven empirically (at which point it could be seen as an empirical statement). Before it was empirical though, it was just a logical statement derived from physical mathematics.

Agree? Disagree?"

Disagree. If it would have turned out to be wrong, I wouldn´t blame the mathematics but the empirical antecedents.

btw, don't use e=mc^2 as an example of logic. There are too many empirical assumptions build into the mathematics of it.

I can give you the derivation if you'd like ;)

"Disagree. If it would have turned out to be wrong, I wouldn´t blame the mathematics but the empirical antecedents."

Yes, we agree but that misses the point.

That the theory was inspired by empirical antecedents, and whether or not it proved right or not, does not affect the point.

E=MC2 was arrived at by mathematics (pure logic). It may have had an empirical beginnings, but it was no empirical conclusion - it traversed from empericism to logic, arriving at an unproven, logical conclusion. It could not be considered an empirical statement until E=MC2 was demonstrated experimentally (by Cockcroft and Walton in 1932).

That's how I sees it anyhow.

Prof.

prof,

"But reason and experience would inform us that logical conclusion can't be trusted until we first know that there is only one X. (In other words, if we don't know that X is singular, there may also be X in B). "

and now you're on my side of the fence. That inquiry is precisely my complaint with so-called metaphysical logic. The givens are necessarily fuzzy, since they don't represent discrete physical phenominon and, therefore, are beyond the purview of scientific inquiry.